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1.0 Introduction
The electric power industry is a major component of the United States economy.  It
accounts for over $210 billion in annual sales, $40 billion in annual investment, and 35 percent of
primary energy use.  For the past ninety years, this industry has been treated as a “natural
monopoly.”  Vertically integrated utilities have operated within designated local geographic retail
franchises, subject to pervasive regulation of prices, service quality, investment, and entry by
competitive rivals.  These local monopolies typically owned or contractually controlled sufficient
generation to serve the full needs of their franchised retail customers.  Likewise, their customers
had little choice but to purchase their full electricity requirements from their local monopoly
utility.
This monolithic vertically integrated structure began to unravel in 1978 with the passage
of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA).  PURPA created a special class of
wholesale generators known on Qualifying Facilities (QFs) and required utilities to purchase at
regulated prices all the power these QFs produced.  This overcame the monopsony power of
utilities to simply refuse to purchase QF power, but the ensuing experience with state-regulated
pricing was largely an economic failure.  Disillusionment with this regulated pricing regime
quickly led many state regulatory commissions to adopt competitive auctions for soliciting new
generation capacity.  But these centralized procurement processes were also flawed.  The local
utility was still the sole procurement agent acting on behalf of its retail franchised customers so
that individual customers still had no ability to choose their suppliers.  Moreover, supply-side
business interests rapidly became adept at influencing the key decision of how much new
generation should be solicited through these competitive auctions.  By the early 1990s, the
political-economy of the electricity industry was becoming increasingly intolerable in several
states, contributing to retail electricity prices 50% above the national average.
On April 20, 1994, California broke from this traditional industry structure and became the
first state to adopt “direct access” – the ability of end-use customers to “shop” the electricity grid
and choose their own retail suppliers.  Other states quickly followed California’s lead, especially
the high-cost states in the U.S. Northeast.  By June 1999, 23 of the 50 states in the U.S. had
adopted policies to phase-in direct access over relatively brief transition periods.  Thus, the U.S.
joined the international trend toward liberalization of retail electricity markets.
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The purpose of this chapter is to explore the ways in which U.S. companies are
responding strategically to these regulatory initiatives and radically reshaping the U.S. and
international electric power industries.  It is important to keep in mind that business strategies
manifest themselves in two basic ways.  First, economic interest groups pursue rent-seeking
strategies to shape the regulatory “rules of the game” to their own favor.  Second, within the
framework of these established rules, businessmen realign their asset portfolios and devise new
value-added service strategies to maximize value for their shareholders.  For the most part, this
chapter will focus on the second of these two categories of corporate strategy.
2.0     The Organization and Regulation of the U.S. Power Industry
To understand corporate strategies in the U.S. power industry, it is first necessary to
understand certain basic features of its industrial structure as well as the federal and state
institutions that regulate it.  To begin with, the industry is huge.  It is composed of more than
3,000 utilities with about 800,000 megawatts of generating capacity, delivering more than 3
trillion kilowatt-hours, and generating revenues over $200 billion annually.
2  More than 75
percent of retail electricity sales are made by investor-owned utilities (IOUs).  These institutions
are the main focus of the restructuring reforms taking place in the U.S. and are the primary
subject of the discussion here.  But it is important to recognize that the ownership structure of the
electric power industry is among the most peculiar of any American industry.  In addition to the
almost 200 IOUs and numerous investor-owned independent generators, wholesale brokers,
marketers and retailers, there are also numerous important publicly owned power entities.  These
include about 2,000 local municipal utilities, about 1,000 rural electric cooperatives, six federal
power marketing authorities, and numerous public power districts and state-owned power
projects.  These public power entities are generally not regulated by either the state public utility
commissions (PUCs) or the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).  Nonetheless, they
are an important part of the competitive landscape and their separate regulatory and tax treatment
is a source of nearly constant competitive anxiety to IOUs.
2.1 Historical Foundations of Regulation
Beginning in the first decade of this century, state PUCs began imposing economic
regulation on IOUs.  By 1916, 33 states had utility regulatory commissions.  The scope of state
regulation was very broad and generally governed retail prices, quality of service, obligation to
provide service within designated geographic franchise areas, protection against entry of
competitive suppliers, and approval of major new investments.  During the 1920s, two significant
developments took place.  First, utilities began becoming more interconnected with one another,
including interconnections across state boundaries.  Second, holding company structures began to
dominate major portions of the industry.  Both of these trends created an industry structure which
could not be satisfactorily regulated by individual state PUCs, largely because of the U.S.
Constitutional prohibition against states regulating interstate commerce.
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These events led to the passage in 1935 of both the Federal Power Act (FPA) and the
Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA). Under the FPA, the federal government asserted
jurisdiction over the “regulatory gap” that had developed between state PUCs due to their
inability to regulate interstate commerce.  The FPA conferred this task upon the Federal Power
Commission (which in the mid 1970s was restructured as the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission).  Under PUHCA, private companies are essentially prohibited from owning electric
facilities in more than one state unless these facilities are directly interconnected.
To adequately understand the U.S. power industry it is essential to appreciate that federal
regulation by the FERC does not have the same pervasive scope as regulation by the state PUCs.
Instead, under the U.S. structure of regulatory federalism, state PUCs traditionally have exercised
the primary regulatory control over utilities while the FERC simply plugged the gaps between
states by regulating interstate electricity commerce (although this traditional model of state-
federal jurisdiction seems to be rapidly eroding under the current industry restructuring).
Specifically, the FERC regulates the pricing, terms and conditions of both power sales for resale
(i.e., wholesale power sales) and transmission services in interstate commerce.  Because, with the
exception of Texas, the U.S. power industry operates as two huge synchronous grids – the
Western Interconnection and the Eastern Interconnection – all wholesale power sales and
transmission services offered by IOUs, except those in Texas, are regulated by the FERC.  The
FERC also has authority to approve power pooling arrangements and mergers.  However, unlike
state PUCs, the FERC does not establish exclusive geographic franchises, control entry of
competitors, impose an obligation to serve, or license any electrical facilities (other than
hydroelectric dams).
2.2 Emerging Competition
For the first 30 years following World War II, the dominant trend in the electricity
industry was the growth and consolidation of most IOUs into vertically integrated enterprises,
owning or controlling the generation resources needed to satisfy their retail customers’ demands
and becoming continually more interconnected with one another.  This structure of regional
vertically integrated monoliths all began to change with the passage of PURPA in 1978.  Under
PURPA, utilities were obligated to purchase power from QFs and pay them PUC-regulated prices
equal to the purchasing utility’s “avoided cost” – i.e., the cost the utility would otherwise have
incurred in the absence of purchases from QFs.  QFs were freed of any further economic
regulation by state PUCs and given an exemption to PUHCA thereby allowing enterprises to own
QFs in multiple states.  Significantly, IOUs were allowed to own up to 50% of a QF.  Some state
PUCs were quite aggressive in establishing liberal pricing terms for QF power and strong QF
industries developed in these states.  The large number of QFs developed in these states clearly
demonstrated the physical feasibility of maintaining reliability while integrating large numbers of
independent generators into power systems.  This also created a strong political-economic
constituency for further structural change.
By the mid-1980s, some businesses became interested in developing stand-alone, merchant
generation facilities that did not meet the narrow technical qualifications of a QF.  But
development of these facilities faced certain impediments.  Among these impediments was the fact
that these facilities would be subject to regulation by FERC under the FPA if they sold power to a
local utility.  Based in part on the demonstrated successes of QF development, the FERC wanted4
to encourage the development of these stand-alone, merchant non-QF generators.  Therefore, it
launched its “market-based” regulation initiative.  Rather than regulating prices based on
traditional cost-of-service principles, the FERC began approving wholesale prices as “just and
reasonable” under the FPA based upon a demonstration that they were negotiated at arms-length
in a competitive environment in which the buyer had a reasonable number of alternative suppliers
and the seller had no substantial market power, especially vertical market power due to control of
transmission.
Despite the FERC’s successful market-based price regulation initiative, there remained
several barriers to the further development of merchant generation and more competitively
structured wholesale power markets.  First, provision of transmission service by a utility was
entirely voluntary.  This gave utilities a degree of monopsony power over independent generators
as well as the potential to use their transmission strategically to favor their own generation.
Second, non-QF independent generation developers still faced the PUHCA prohibition against
owning non-interconnected generation facilities in multiple states.
In 1992, the federal government removed both of these competitive impediments by
enacting the Energy Policy Act (EPAct).  EPAct mandated that utilities provide wholesale (not
retail) transmission access under FERC regulatory oversight.  EPAct also created Exempt
Wholesale Generators (EWGs) by exempting from the PUHCA prohibition against scattered
multi-state facilities any stand-alone generator selling its power to a utility for resale.  EWGs were
specifically forbidden from selling their power to end-use retail customers.  But EWGs were not
exempted from FERC regulation under the FPA and the FERC must still determine that their
prices are just and reasonable.
Instead of mandating any particular direction for industry reform, EPAct simply removed
these two very significant impediments to wholesale competition.  It is important to recognize that
EPAct did nothing to directly mandate electric industry restructuring.  Indeed, it strengthened
existing barriers to the introduction of retail competition by expressly prohibiting the FERC from
ordering transmission access for retail customers and prohibiting EWGs from selling their power
directly to retail customers.  Nonetheless, EPAct so substantially altered the discretion of utilities
over wholesale transmission access and introduced such large new business opportunities for
EWGs that it suddenly propelled the industry toward a new equilibrium.
Immediately following the passage of EPAct, the main FERC agenda was to use its newly
expanded authority to further encourage wholesale competition.  This meant establishing a simple
ministerial process for certifying EWGs, implementing open wholesale transmission access rules,
resolving the wholesale stranded cost issues created by open wholesale access, and continuing its
market-based pricing initiative.  By far the greatest new challenge was to implement the
transmission access provisions of EPAct in such a way as to maximize wholesale competition by
removing utility vertical market power over transmission.  Ultimately, in orders 888 and 889, the
FERC chose to accomplish this by ordering all utilities to internally separate their transmission
service from their power marketing functions, implement strict codes of conduct for transmission
service personnel, establish internet data bases with real-time posting of transmission availability
and pricing, and file highly prescriptive pro-forma open-access transmission tariffs with FERC.
Order 888 also established eleven principles for the formation of Independent System Operators
(ISOs) but did not mandate their formation.  Although Orders 888 and 889 have been very5
successful in improving non-discriminatory transmission access, complaints still persist about
alleged anticompetitive and discriminatory practices.  This has led some parties to advocate
mandatory participation of utilities in Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) such as ISOs.
In April 1999, the FERC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to explore these issues with the
intention of promulgating further rules.
2.3 The Retail Access Revolution
Following the passage of EPAct in 1992, the California PUC initiated a proceeding to
decide what, if anything, the PUC should do in response to this federal legislation.  It was not
clear that any action was necessary, but California’s electricity regulatory structure was in crisis.
Electricity prices were 50% above the national average, the state was in a major recession, and
businesses were leaving to locate in adjacent states.  Most parties seemed to agree that
California’s central planning process for procuring new generation resources had become
dysfunctional and too costly, but there was no consensus concerning a solution.  Large customers
wanted retail access, but utilities, small consumers, QFs, environmentalists, and labor unions were
all opposed.  Ultimately, free market philosophy and lack of an appealing alternative won the day.
On April 20, 1994, the PUC issued its landmark decision
3 adopting direct retail access.  Other
states quickly followed, especially those in the Northeast which generally had comparably dismal
histories of expensive and politicized resource procurement processes and high retail rates.
As shown in Figures 1 and 2, by June 1999, 23 of the 50 states had adopted retail access
policies.  Not surprisingly, these policy initiatives were concentrated in those states where
previous institutions had seemingly failed to result in inexpensive power.  16 of the 23 states
adopting retail access have average retail prices exceeding 6.5￿/kWh and virtually every state in
this price range has adopted retail access.  On the other hand, only 7 of 31 states with prices
below 6.5¢ have adopted retail access.  Moreover, several of these states are quite vocal in their
reluctance to adopt retail access, fearing it will raise electricity prices in their states.  In view of
this bipolar division among the states, it is questionable whether the federal government will act
any time soon to mandate retail access nationwide.  In fact, a coalition of 23 state PUCs was
formed in late 1998 for the purpose of lobbying the U.S. Congress not to force a retail access
mandate on the states, but instead to allow states to proceed on their own initiative.  Thus,
although it is certainly possible that federal legislation could be enacted to further clarify state-
federal jurisdictional authorities, establish new reliability institutions, or further facilitate
competition, it does not seem likely there will be a federal mandate ordering nationwide retail
access in the near future.  Without such a federal mandate, it seems doubtful that the number of
states adopting retail access will increase very fast in the next few years pending more experience
in those states that have.
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This produces a mixed strategic picture for U.S. utilities.  Several major national and
international players such as Edison International, PG&E, GPU, CMS, and PSE&G will be
operating from local bases in which retail access has already been adopted.  Some large holding
companies such as AEP and Entergy will be straddling states in both worlds.  Still other
companies – especially significant players based in the southeast such as Southern, Duke, and FPL
– will be operating from local fortresses still structured as vertically integrated monopolies.  These
differences will undoubtedly affect corporate strategies.
2.4 The Impacts of Regulatory Changes on Corporate Strategy
Utilities and other enterprises develop business strategies to pursue promising business
opportunities within the changing structure of utility regulation.  Corporate strategies are heavily
influenced by the regulatory rules of the game and, in some cases, it is essential to understand
these rules in order to understand the strategic choices made.  Within the U.S. structure of
regulatory federalism, there is a single set of federal rules (not necessarily clear and unambiguous)
but a patchwork of state rules and no clear nationwide consensus yet on retail access.  Thus,
utilities operating in states with retail access will generally pursue different corporate strategies
from those in other states.
Regardless of whether a utility operates in a state with retail access, its strategies will be
affected by changes in federal regulations.  The following are the most important of these federal
changes and their basic impacts on business strategies:
•  Open wholesale transmission access:  With the enactment of mandatory wholesale
transmission access by EPAct, ownership of transmission has lost much of its strategic
value.  Implementation of EPAct through FERC Orders 888 and 889 and, more
recently, the voluntary formation of ISOs and the prospect of possible mandatory
participation in an RTO have gone even further to eliminate the strategic value of
utility transmission ownership.  At the same time, these initiatives have tremendously
strengthened the structure of wholesale markets by broadening their geographic scope
and increasing investor confidence by reducing the potential for discriminatory
commercial abuses by transmission owners.
•  Creation of EWGs:  By creating EWGs, Congress enabled generation developers to
own stand-alone, non-QF generation throughout the U.S.  It also allowed these
generators to freely buy and sell power at wholesale.  Together these provisions have
facilitated the development of large numbers of new merchant plants, encouraged the
stunning growth of independent marketers, and enabled utilities to expand their
ownership of non-QF generation into other states thereby reducing their resistance to
divesting major portions of their traditional vertically integrated generation portfolios
as part of comprehensive state-mandated retail access plans.
•  Market-Based Pricing:  Major credit for the progress toward competitive wholesale
markets must be assigned to the market-based regulatory initiative launched by FERC
in the late 1980s.  Market-based price regulation was absolutely necessary in making
wholesale marketing and merchant development of EWGs attractive enterprises.  This
initiative was enabled by the fact that the FPA fortunately does not prescribe the8
application of cost-of-service regulation by FERC, but instead merely directs FERC to
assure that wholesale prices are “just and reasonable.”  Without FERC’s bold initiative
instituting market-based pricing, none of the competitive wholesale market revolution
of the last decade could have taken place except through Congressional legislation – a
rather unlikely event.
Thus, even in the absence of individual state actions to adopt retail access, federal
initiatives would be creating competitive wholesale electricity markets and having major
influences on utility business strategies.  In particular, the strategic value of owning transmission
would still be substantially reduced, the geographic scope of wholesale markets would be
substantially expanded, numerous wholesale marketers would be entering the market,
entrepreneurs would be developing merchant non-QF generation, and utilities would likely be
undertaking modest generation divestitures to reduce their local generation market shares
sufficient to receive market-based wholesale pricing authority from FERC.
The adoption of retail access by many states has created regulatory structures that, for the
most part, complement and extend the changes taking place in wholesale markets essentially by
making these markets accessible to retail customers.  Moreover, largely due to the structure of
past institutions, the move toward retail access has resulted in the regulatory jurisdiction over
large segments of the industry being massively shifted from state PUCs to the FERC without any
deliberate intent to do so.  This shift includes the pricing, terms and conditions associated with
new owners of divested generation, services provided by ISOs including ancillary services and all
transmission services, and even distribution services supplied to a direct access customer.
Essentially, state PUCs are left with regulatory jurisdiction primarily over local distribution
networks (even then, somewhat ambiguously), independent retailers (whom, in general, the PUCs
are trying not to heavily regulate), and the terms under which the local distribution utility
continues to offer retail services such as basic energy supply, metering and billing to end-use
customers not choosing to purchase these services from competitive firms.  The following are the
most important elements of state retail access initiatives and their broad impacts on business
strategies:
•  Stranded Cost Recovery:  At the beginning of retail access initiatives, credible
independent research estimated the level of utility stranded costs at $100 to $200
billion nationwide.  Moreover, as previously discussed, these stranded costs were
concentrated in the states with the highest retail rates – those most inclined to adopt
retail access.  For most utilities in these states, every other dimension of corporate
strategy paled in comparison to assuring recovery of stranded generation costs.
Subsequently, most states adopting retail access have allowed utilities to recover
almost all stranded costs in exchange for other political concessions.  While the precise
mechanisms for recovery of stranded costs vary considerably from state to state, most
of these mechanisms create incentives for utilities to divest major portions of their
traditional non-nuclear generation.  To the extent that utilities are allowed to retain
ownership of non-nuclear generation, they are encouraged or directed to place this
generation in a separate “unregulated” subsidiary (FERC market-based regulation still
applies).9
•  Utility Role in Competitive Energy Retailing:  While rules vary by state, most states
adopting retail access have required utilities to establish separate retailing subsidiaries
if they wish to offer competitive retailing services (e.g., commodity energy hedging,
etc.).  Utilities themselves are restricted to offering only regulated tariffed services and
there are political pressures to confine these services to “plain vanilla” services rather
than specialized products designed to compete actively with third-party retailers.  No
state has yet to adopt a plan that would somehow involuntarily re-assign customers to
competitive retailers at the outset of restructuring.  Instead, the local utility is
designated as the “default provider.”  That is, if a customer does not make an explicit
choice to be served by another retailer, the local utility remains its retail supplier.  This
gives the incumbent utility the advantage of customer inertia in maintaining market
share, but this “advantage” typically creates no profit opportunity because default
service prices are generally set on a cost pass-through basis with no profit margin.
This zero-profit structure serves no one’s commercial interest – neither utility nor
independent retailer.  This arrangement is probably not stable in the long term.  In
several states, the long-run role of the local utility in default service has been explicitly
reserved as an issue to be re-visited after several years of experience.
•  Metering and Billing:  It is difficult to generalize about metering and billing rules
across states.  Most states have opened billing to competition, but many states have
been reluctant to open metering to competition, at least initially.  Key questions are
whether the local utility should be the default provider of metering and billing; if so,
whether the utility should provide a cost-credit to retailers providing their own
metering and billing; or whether metering and billing should simply be deregulated.
Strategic developments in this area will likely take a few years to become clearer as
regulatory rules develop further.  Given the advantages of scale economies in these
activities, it seems likely that the long-term victors will be large, information
processing enterprises doing business on a regional or national scale.
•  Affiliate Rules:  Most states have adopted very strict rules designed to erect “fire
walls” between monopoly functions (e.g., transmission, distribution, and default
retailing) and new competitive ventures affiliated with the utility.  For instance, in most
states the utility is precluded from making referrals of customers preferentially to
affiliated competitive businesses or from giving affiliates preferential access to
competitively sensitive information of any kind.  These rules substantially constrain the
range of business strategies that utilities might find attractive in a less restrictive
regulatory environment.
Taken together, state retail access policies are having substantial impacts on utility
business strategies and corporate structures.  In general, utilities are being encouraged or directed
to place their competitive activities in separate subsidiaries and retain only their monopoly utility
functions within the regulated utility.  Specifically, they are being encouraged to divest some or all
of their non-nuclear generation and place the remainder into “unregulated” subsidiaries.  Likewise,
to the extent they wish to offer competitive retailing services, they are being required to develop
these businesses as strictly separate subsidiaries.  As a matter of public policy, these mandated
corporate structures appear in many instances to eliminate certain efficiencies of scale and scope.
The implicit judgment by regulators appears to be that this potential loss of static efficiencies is10
more than offset by the resulting dynamic efficiencies of increased competition, or simply by the
possible populist benefits of reducing the utilities’ political-economic power or building a
constituent base of competitive enterprises beholden to regulators for their existence and
economic protection.
2.5 The Technological Foundations of Restructuring
In the causal chain driving institutional change, current technological boundaries form the
basis of relative economic scarcity and, therefore, resulting market prices.  These prices, in turn,
direct incremental technological innovations toward breakthroughs having the greatest economic
payoffs.  Meanwhile, social institutions tend to evolve to support the social organization of
production most compatible with the most economical production technologies.  Thus,
technological change and its associated economies are key drivers of institutional change.
Ironically, the current retail restructuring of electricity markets is not being driven
primarily by technological changes internal to the power industry itself, but rather by changes
external to it, especially information processing and communication technologies.  Many
observers like to point to the recent progress in gas turbine development that has dramatically
improved thermal efficiencies and reduced optimal scale.  Many even predict that large central-
station generation will soon be a thing of the past.  Those changes undoubtedly fanned the fires of
wholesale competition by creating favorable economics for cogeneration, on-site self-generation,
and small scale EWGs.  They also ultimately fanned the fires of retail competition by creating
incremental generation economies that were considerably below the embedded cost of generation
for utilities in many states (although falling gas prices would have been sufficient by themselves).
This created a strong constituency for attempting to bypass the sunk costs embedded in utilities’
generation portfolios.  But it is important to recognize that these forces would not have found
effect without the enabling technologies of the information revolution.  Only in the 1990s did it
become realistic to implement the huge information exchanges necessary to coordinate the system
in the absence of vertical integration, conduct the necessary myriad market transactions, and
figure out who owed what to whom when the day was done.  Without the information processing
revolution, widespread retail access would be impossible.
As we move forward, further technological changes loom on the horizon.  Advancements
will continue to occur in information and communications systems creating intelligent real-time
load management and other services for end users.  This will complement the current structures
implementing retail access.  However, advancements in small-scale distributed generation can also
be expected.  While such advancements should be welcomed, their impact on current and evolving
institutions are difficult to predict.  One impact may be to stifle investment in additional high-
voltage transmission and thereby hasten the demise of central station power by means of a self-
fulfilling prophecy.11
3.0 Recent Business Strategies In Response To Structural Change
The U.S. power industry is huge and diverse.  The remainder of this chapter attempts to
summarize the major changes taking place.  The main emphasis is focused on the business
strategies being pursued by traditional IOUs and the major independent power players.  At this
point, the broad dimensions of restructuring are reasonably clear.  The once vertically integrated
columnar structure of the industry is being restructured into three horizontal strata of yet
determined geographic scope.  The top and bottom strata, generation and retailing, are being
functionally or structurally separated from the middle two natural monopoly strata, transmission
and local distribution.  Prices in the competitive segment are being “deregulated” and open access
to monopoly elements is being mandated at regulated prices, terms and conditions.  Traditional
IOUs are “repositioning” their assets by attempting to transfer their valuable assets from regulated
to non-regulated activities, with the consent of regulators and other stakeholders, while also
attempting to develop valuable competitive expertise in emerging new service markets.  It is
unlikely these incumbent IOUs will be able to succeed on a competitive basis in all the areas they
traditionally pursued as protected monopolists.  For those who choose wisely, there will be many
opportunities to capture value.  The strategic trends reviewed below include:  the explosion of
competitive wholesale marketing, the consolidation of IOUs through mergers and acquisitions, the
huge divestitures and repurchasing of generation by IOUs, the emergence of retail energy
services, the diversification of IOUs into telecommunications, the possible evolution of
independent transmission companies, and the branching out of all players into foreign investments.
3.1 Wholesale Power Marketing
Wholesale power marketers are simply entities who own power and sell it for resale under
market-based price regulation.  They acquire ownership over power by either producing it
themselves or acquiring title from another party.  Power marketers fall under the pricing
jurisdiction of the FERC.  FERC has granted market-based pricing to well over 500 marketers
including 337 entities that are entirely independent of IOUs, 123 entities affiliated with traditional
IOUs, and 73 IOUs.
4  In creating EWGs, EPAct specifically provided that they be allowed to buy
and sell power at wholesale.  Thus, EPAct created a potentially huge number of additional power
marketers.  Later, FERC further broadened the field by ruling that contracts, books and records
were not “facilities” under the meaning of PUHCA.
5  As a result, a power marketer acting as a
pure middleman does not fall under the restrictions of PUHCA and, therefore, need not apply for
exemption as an EWG.  More importantly, since not required to apply for status as an EWG,
these pure middlemen are not governed by the prohibition against retail sales applicable to EWGs
and can, therefore, make sales in both wholesale and retail markets.
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The volume of sales by power marketers is probably the best single index of the growth of
competitive wholesale electricity markets in the U.S.  This growth has been nothing less than
dramatic since the beginning of 1995.  In the first quarter of 1995, there were only eight active
marketers and their total sales were only 1.8 million Mwhs.  By the third quarter of 1998, there
were 120 active wholesale power marketers making sales totaling 850 million Mwhs.
Table 1 shows the top ten marketers during the third quarter of 1998.  Although these
statistics are national and fail to indicate anything about concentration in regional markets, they
suggest very active, competitive markets.  Together the top ten marketers account for a bit less
than two-thirds of all sales.  Moreover, this percentage has declined from almost three-quarters in
1996.  While Enron is the clear leader and likely to remain so for some time, its relative market
share has steadily slipped as new players have developed.  (For instance, Enron’s market share
was 35.7% in the first quarter of 1996).
Table 1
Top Ten Wholesale Power Marketers
MWHs Market Shares
Enron Power Marketing 161.2 19.3
Southern Co. Energy Marketing* 66.3 7.9
Electric Clearing House 51.4 6.2
Aquila Energy (UtiliCorp)* 43.7 5.2
LG&E Energy Marketing* 41.7 5.0
Entergy Power Marketing * 38.2 4.6
Duke Energy Trading and Marketing* 31.7 3.8
PG&E Energy Trading* 30.4 3.7
Statoil Energy Trading 29.6 3.5
PacifiCorp Power Marketing* 27.4 3.3
All Others 328.4 37.5
Total 850.0 100.0
* Affiliates of traditional utilities.
Source:  Edison Electric Institute, Edison Times, December 1998.
It is impossible to associate the phenomenal growth of wholesale power marketing with a
particular business strategy.  Instead, it is the manifestation of several strategies.  Traditionally,
utilities would use wholesale power markets on an opportunistic basis to sell power from the
portion of their facilities not being immediately used to serve their retail franchise customers, or to
buy power from other utilities when it was cheaper than generating the power from their own
facilities.  Virtually all utilities engaged in these activities, but the efficiency of these markets was
inhibited by the uncertain availability of transmission.  Moreover, the urgency of consummating
transactions was reduced by the fact that most utilities controlled sufficient physical facilities to
meet their retail customers’ power needs and retail customers were “captive” and had to pay the
utilities’ power procurement costs regardless of their levels.
In the newly restructured industry, new factors are driving the increased activity in power
markets.  New independent generators rely on power marketing expertise to maximize the value
of their assets.  Likewise, even traditional utilities are under increased pressure to increase the
performance and utilization of their generation and transmission assets.  Furthermore, as retail13
direct access proceeds, many utilities have come under pressure to divest a portion of their
generation assets.  This has left them in a situation in which they no longer own generation
adequate to serve the demands of those retail customers who have not yet chosen alternative
suppliers.  They now have an urgent need for power marketer services to help them handle these
suddenly exposed market risks.  Likewise, newly emerging retailers have similar needs for the risk
management services of power marketers.  Moreover, retail access has also exposed the
previously unsatisfied demands of customers for customized energy-related services.
In general, three different approaches have emerged in the power marketing business:  the
generation, retail, and intermediary strategies.  The generation approach is the most traditional
and focuses on selling generation output into the highest value markets.  The retail approach
focuses on working closely with end-users to identify needs and then going into the power market
to satisfy these needs.  The intermediary approach aggregates power from various sources,
separates these portfolios into individual risk components, and then repackages these components
into various physical and financial products to meet both individual customer and retailer needs.
Along with the new demands for power marketing services are also new abilities to satisfy
them due largely to open wholesale transmission access.  Wholesale trading hubs and marketing
centers are beginning to emerge for electricity similar to those in the gas industry.  These hubs
provide for price discovery for standard products traded at physical transfer points.  This fosters
the development of market liquidity.  When the trade press began publishing wholesale power
prices in 1994, prices were available for only seven locations.  Published prices are now available
for approximately 24 locations.  Futures trading in electricity began at the New York Mercantile
Exchange (NYMEX) in 1997.  NYMEX now has trading in four futures contracts – two in the
Western Interconnection and two in the Eastern Interconnection.  NYMEX reported that in 1998
more than 80 million futures contracts were traded, an increase of nearly 10 million over 1997.
Options trading also increased to more than 15 million in 1998, an increase of nearly 2 million
over 1997.
6  The Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) offers trading in two contracts – one at
ComEd and another at TVA.  The Minneapolis Grain Exchange offers a contract for delivery at
Minneapolis.  Furthermore, both NYMEX and CBOT are pursuing the expansion of futures
trading to additional delivery points.
7  As the geographic scope of markets expands and trading
becomes more regular and liquid, new option and hedging contracts will emerge to assist market
players in managing risks.  Especially due to the importance of gas as a boiler fuel in powerplants
operating at the price-setting margin during most hours of the day, electricity markets and gas
markets are converging.  Transmission of electricity has become a substitute for transporting gas,
and vice versa.  Considerable locational and temporal arbitrage opportunities will continue to
develop.  This is already in evidence in the list of top ten marketers in Table 1.  Most have
considerable gas interests and expertise.
                                           
6  James R. Kukart, “Utility Stocks in the Spotlight,” Utility Business, April 1999, p. 54.
7  “Staff Report to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission on the Causes of Wholesale Electric Pricing
Abnormalities in the Midwest during June 1998,” September 22, 1998.14
Traditional utilities all have internal power marketing functions and many will be tempted
to expand these functions as a business strategy.  Therefore, the field is likely to remain crowded
with low profit margins.  But even in the long term, most observers expect wholesale power
marketing will remain a high-volume, low-margin, risky business.  Episodes like the 1998 midwest
price spike will lead periodically to sober reassessments of business strategies such as the total
withdrawal from the futures market of major players like LG&E who recently left the speculative
side of the power trading business to focus on the development of their physical generation
portfolio.
3.2 Utility Mergers and Acquisitions
One of the most visible manifestations of corporate strategies in response to electricity
market restructuring is the large number of utility mergers.  Table 2 shows a list of the largest of
these mergers.  Although merger activity increased from historical levels even in the years
immediately preceding EPAct, it accelerated enormously in subsequent years.
In reviewing utility merger activity, it is important to keep in mind that the market for
corporate control of utilities in the U.S. is unusually constrained by PUHCA.  There may well be
many potential suitors for utilities who have no desire to become PUHCA-registered holding
companies.  Therefore, until PUHCA is either substantially amended or repealed, eligible suitors
appear to be severely limited to neighboring utilities or foreign buyers.
The potential explanations for utility mergers are diverse.  Public announcements generally
emphasize two rationale:  achieving efficiency savings through combined operations, and creating
a larger and more diverse organization better able to survive competitively.  Less- public
explanations might include an expectation of increasing the ability to exercise market power as
well as simple satisfaction of management egos.  In truth, it is not so obvious that simple
horizontal mergers of contiguous electric utilities will produce strategic benefits.  The publicly
claimed cost efficiency improvements are usually no more than 2-3% of revenue (and unverifiable
in any event).  Moreover, in view of open transmission access, it is questionable whether the
merged entities would have any greater ability to exercise market power.  The FERC is likely to
order the merged entity to join an RTO, thereby virtually eliminating its ability to exercise greater
vertical market power through control of transmission access.  The FERC will also scrutinize any
increase in horizontal market power and may order some amount of generation divestiture as a
precondition of merger approval.
Setting aside satisfaction of management egos, this leaves the increased ability to survive
competitively as the best motivation for mergers.  Such a rationale must be based on increased
economies of scale and scope.  No doubt many of the almost 200 IOUs in the U.S. are too small
to achieve sufficient scale economies to survive in a competitive market and many of the mergers
may be warranted on this basis.  However, in the new market there will be many niches and
becoming a giant may not be the best survival  strategy for many of these niches.  In energy
trading, for instance, profits depend on speed of response.  Mega-mergers may simply create large
bureaucracies unable to respond profitably in such a fast-paced environment.  To the extent that
mergers are a substitute for a more imaginative competitive strategy, they may prove worse than
doing nothing at all.15
In addition to horizontal mergers which may or may not achieve significant scale
economies, the list in Table 2 also contains many mergers apparently based on achieving increased
economies of scope – especially so-called “convergence” mergers between electricity and gas
companies.  One rationale for these mega-mergers is to form a full-service energy company
capable of supplying integrated energy solutions to medium and large customers.  A separate but
complementary motive is simply to capture efficiencies in the wholesale gas and power markets.
Most observers believe that nearly all new large powerplants built in the next few decades will be
gas-fired.  Moreover, combining gas and electric businesses provides electric companies with a
strategic hedge on the unknown future of distributed generation and its possible impact on the
economic viability of the electric grid.  Thus, the competitive futures of large scale combined-
cycle plants as well as small scale gas-fired fuel cells, cogeneration, microturbines, and
aeroderivative turbine technologies are all speculations driving interest in convergence mergers.
These convergence mergers are clearly evident in Table 2.  Among the most notable are:
•  Gas giant Enron’s acquisition of Portland General Electric;
•  Duke Energy’s purchases of PanEnergy and UP Fuels;
•  Texas Utilities acquisition of Enserch;
•  LILCO’s acquisition of Brooklyn Union Gas;
•  Dominion Resources play for Consolidated Natural Gas;
•  Carolina Power and Light’s move to acquire North Carolina Natural Gas; and
•  Northeast Utilities purchase of Yankee Energy System.
Still more convergence mergers between electric and gas utilities are expected in the future.16
Table 2
Selected Major Utility Mergers and Acquisitions in the Last 10 Years
Partners New Name Completion
Pacific Power & Light
Utah Power & Light
PacifCorp 1989
Midwest Energy
Iowa Resources
Midwest Resources 1990
IE Industries
Iowa Southern Utilities
IES Industries 1991
UtilitCorp United
Centel Corp.
WestPlains Energy 1991
Indiana Michigan Power
Michigan Power
1992
Iowa Power
Iowa Public Service
Midwest Power System 1992
Kansas Power & Light
Kansas Gas & Electric
Western Resources 1992
Northeast Utilities
Public Service of New Hampshire
1992
Entergy
Gulf States Utilities
Entergy 1993
Iowa Electric Light & Power
Iowa Southern Utilities
1993
Texas Utilities
Southwestern Electric Service
Texas Utilities 1993
PSI Resources
Cincinnati Gas & Electric
CINergy 1994
Midwest Resources
Iowa-Illinois Gas & Electric
MidAmerican Energy 1995
Duke Power
PanEnergy
Duke Energy 1997
Enron
Portland General
Enron Portland General
Electric
1997
Houston Industries
NorAm Energy
Houston Industries
(Renamed Reliant)
1997
Ohio Edison
Centerior Energy
FirstEnergy 1997
Texas Utilities
Enserch
Texas Utilities 1997
Public Service of Colorado
Southwestern Public Service
New Century Energies 1997
Puget Sound Power & Light
Washington Energy
1997
Southern Company
Vastor Resources
Southern Company 1997
Union Electric
CIPSCO
Ameren 1997
LG&E Energy
KU Energy
LG&E Energy 1998
Delmarva Power & Light
Atlantic Energy
Conectiv 1998
Long Island Lighting
Brooklyn Union Gas
KeySpan Energy 1998
WPL Holdings
IES Industries
Interstate Power Co.
Alliant 1998
Enova
Pacific Enterprises
Sempra Energy 199817
CalEnergy
MidAmerican Energy
MidAmerican Energy
Holdings Company
1999
Duke Energy
UP Fuels
Duke Energy 1999
Dominion Resources
Consolidated Natural Gas
Dominion Resources Pending
El Paso Energy
Sonat
Pending
Energy East (NYSEG)
Connecticut Energy
Pending
Northern States Power (NSP)
New Century Energies
Pending
National Grid Group
New England Electric (NEES)
Pending
New England Electric (NEES)
Eastern Utilities Associates (EUA)
Pending
SCANA
Public Service of North Carolina
SCANA Pending
AES
Cilcorp
NSTAR Pending
Boston Edison Company (BEC)
Commonwealth Energy
BEC Energy Pending
Consolidated Edison
Orange and Rockland
Consolidated Edison Pending
Sierra Pacific Resources
Nevada Power
Sierra Pacific Resources Pending
Scottish Power
Pacificorp
Pending
Allegheny Power Systems
DQE
Allegheny Energy Pending
American Electric Power
Central and South West
American Electric Power Pending
Western Resources
Kansas City Power & Light
Westar Energy Pending
Carolina Power & Light
North Carolina Natural Gas
Pending
Dynegy
Illinova
Dynegy Pending
New York State Electric & Gas
Central Maine Power
Pending
Northeast Utilities
Yankee Energy System
Pending
Indiana Energy
Southern Indiana Gas & Electric (SIGCORP)
Pending
*  Source:  Edison Electric Institute, Electric Utility Restructuring Activity and
Utility Merger Status Update.
One final phenomenon worth pointing out is that major acquisitions of traditional electric
utilities have not been limited to purchases by other U.S. utilities and foreign companies (as
discussed later).  As also shown in Table 2, two large developers of powerplants, CalEnergy and
AES, have each acquired major utilities – MidAmerican and Cilcorp (pending) – paying $2.42
billion and $885 million respectively.  Another large generation developer, Dynegy, has recently
announced its plan to acquire Illinova.  Independent marketer Enron’s much publicized purchase
of Portland General Electric is also worth noting.18
3.3 Sales and Purchases of Existing Generation
U.S. electric utilities are in the process of divesting substantial portions of their traditional
generation portfolios.  For the most part, this is being done “voluntarily” in exchange for FERC
approval of market-based pricing authority or mergers, or as part of a state-approved retail access
package that provides the utility with recovery of its stranded costs.  Moreover, some utilities may
simply find it profitable to sell their generation at the attractive prices being offered (although
most, if not all, of this surplus is generally being credited to ratepayers).  Only the states of Maine
and Texas have directly ordered utilities to divest generation.
Table 3 shows the amounts of generation being offered and sold in these restructuring-
related divestitures.  The total realignment of generation portfolios is dramatic.  Almost 100,000
MWs of capacity has been offered for sale, with about 60,000 MWs already sold.  Table 4 shows
the top dozen purchasers of this divested generation.  Buyers and sellers seem to fall into several
categories.  First, some utilities clearly have business strategies to remain players in the U.S.
generation market (e.g., Edison Mission Energy and PG&E’s U.S. Generating).  Even though
their parent utilities are divesting generation, their generation affiliates are buying large amounts
of generation elsewhere.  Second, some utilities may be exiting generation altogether with no
intention of returning (e.g., NEES, Montana Power).  Third, some purchasers are independent
generators simply expanding their generation holdings (e.g., Sithe, AES).  Fourth, several buyers
are utilities in the Southeast where state PUCs have generally shown little inclination to adopt
retail access (e.g., Duke, Southern, FPL).  These utilities may harbor hopes of remaining vertically
integrated at home while owning competitive generation in other utilities’ service territories.
Alternatively, they may believe that adoption of direct access in their states will eventually compel
them to divest portions of their local generation so they need to buy generation in other states
now when it is for sale or risk losing their share of the national generation market.
Table 3 also shows many nuclear plants are for sale.  Over the past year, there has been
considerable discussion and speculation regarding consolidation of the nuclear industry.
AmerGen, a partnership of PECO and British Energy purchased GPU’s Three Mile Island I
station.  Entergy recently entered into an agreement to purchase Pilgrim from Boston Edison.
AmerGen has shown serious interest in purchasing the Vermont Yankee plant.  In time, many
industry analysts believe that nuclear plant ownership will be concentrated in a small number of
operating companies.19
Table 3
Restructuring-Related Generation Divestiture
(MWs Sold and Offered)
Company
Fossil and
Hydro (MWs)
Nuclear and Power
Contracts (MWs)
Bangor Hydro 166 282
BEC Energy 1,983 670
Central Hudson 972
Central and South West 550
CMP Group 1,233 574
Con Ed 6,293
Commonwealth Energy 984 675
DQE 3,311
Edison International 9,562
Energy East 2,366 210
EUA 543 522
GPU 5,346 1,522
Green Mountain Power 118
KeySpan 206
Maine Public Service 92 18
Montana Power 1,556 104
NEES 3,960 1,100
Nevada Power 1,964
Niagara Mohawk 3,917 1,080
Northeast Utilities 3,772 435
Orange & Rockland 962
PacifiCorp 1,042
PEPCO 6,120 680
PP&L Resources 425
PG&E Corp. 10,924
Portland General 2,485
Puget Sound Energy 735
Sempra Energy 1,976 800
Sierra Pacific 1,085
UGI 70
UniCom 11,570
Unisource 1,992
United Illuminating 1,133 129
Unitil 24 267
Vermont Yankee 540
Total 88,819 9,814
Source:  Edison Electric Institute, Divestiture Action and Analysis, April 1999.20
Table 4
Leading Purchasers of Recently Divested Utility Generation
Company Capacity
(MWs)
1.  Edison Mission Energy* 11,656
2.  Southern Energy* 6,595
3.  Sithe Energies 6,100
4.  AES 5,380
5.  NRG Energy* 4,938
6.  U.S. Generating* 3,960
7.  Reliant* 3,776
8.  Duke Energy* 2,745
9.  PPL Global* 2,710
10.  Orion Holdings 2,516
11.  FPL Group* 2,425
12.  KeySpan Energy* 2,168
All Others 4,698
59,667
* Affiliates of traditional utilities
Source:  Edison Electric Institute, Divestiture Action and
Analysis, April 1999.
Utilities are accustomed to owning and operating generation.  Many undoubtedly believe
that they are reasonably competent in doing so and will pursue a strategy to remain in this
business.  But it is rapidly becoming a far different business than they are used to.  The new game
has no “captive” retail customers to absorb the risks of inefficient generator operations.  Instead,
the new generation business is one of efficiently managing an asset in a competitive wholesale
market.  It will necessarily involve not only traditional physical operational competencies but also
new power marketing expertise or alliances.  Key strategies for success will include risk sharing
with fuel providers, redesigning operation and maintenance practices, a much more disciplined
approach to incremental capital additions, and building a portfolio of regional generating assets to
capture economies of operations and integrated bidding.  It seems reasonable to expect that the
core of survivors will be considerably smaller than the number of past utility incumbents and that
the U.S. generation market will become more concentrated.
3.4 New Merchant Powerplants
Regardless of the further spread of retail access, it is doubtful that any new generation
plant will ever again be constructed under the traditional cost-of-service framework.  Instead, the
market will be relied upon to bring forth adequate new generation.  There are clear signs that the
market is responding enthusiastically to this challenge.  In its March 1999 survey of the electric
utility industry, Goldman Sachs compiled an extensive (though not necessarily comprehensive) list
of new merchant generation facilities planned or under construction in the U.S.  The list totals21
85,030 MWs, with more than 30,000 MW in the northeast, roughly 10,000 MW each in the
southeast, midwest, and southwest, and over 20,000 MW in the far west.
The list of companies in all areas is extremely diverse.  U.S. Generating (PG&E) is a big
player in the northeast with plans for over 9,000 MW, almost one-third of the new planned
additions.  Sithe is the largest of the independents in the northeast in terms of planned additions
with 4,300 MW.  In California, the California Energy Commission lists 20 projects totaling
13,464 MWs as current, expected or approved licensing cases.  These projects are spread among
13 separate developers.  Calpine is the largest with 2,380 MWs.  U.S. Generating is second
largest with 2,098 MW.  Duke is third with 1,736 MWs.
3.5 Energy Services Retailing
As each successive state adopts retail access, its native utilities have had to decide their
retailing strategies.  The result has been a cultural shock for utility management.  Each utility has
been engaged for years in “marketing” energy services to captive customers.  Most believe they
have some amount of retailing experience and expertise, and certainly all have a large number of
retailing employees with a vested interest in pursuing a retailing strategy.  Moreover, years of
thinking like vertically integrated monopolies tends to make management inclined erroneously to
regard the financial security of all their upstream investments as being critically dependent on their
retaining a base of retail customers.  In short, every traditional utility has a knee-jerk corporate
reflex to want to retain as many of its current retail customers as possible and the more aggressive
utilities want to pursue a regional or national retailing business.
But a more sober strategic assessment usually arises to challenge this conventional reflex.
First, a large part of the retailing business is a pure commodity business with the primary services
being the provision of various risk hedges especially to large customers.  While this business is
familiar to wholesale power marketers, it is almost totally foreign to the traditional utility’s
retailing employees.  Moreover, it is a risky, low-margin business likely to draw a good deal of
concern from the utility’s chief financial officer.  Second, being a successful retailer to large
customers with nationwide accounts may require a national, or at least broad regional, retailing
operation.  It may not be possible to operate a smaller regional retailing operation and expect to
be successful with large customers.  Third, it is not at all obvious that successful retailing is
required in order to be successful at any other upstream production and delivery activity.  Fourth,
all states adopting retail access have also adopted very strict retailing affiliate rules designed to
neutralize the incumbent advantages of the utility and its affiliates in retailing.  In general, utilities
are prohibited from offering anything but the simplest of tariffs to customers.  More attractive
“competitive” products can be offered only through a retailing affiliate and the utility is prohibited
from preferentially referring its customers to its affiliate or giving its affiliate preferential access to
any customer information.
Thus far in the U.S., development of competitive retailing in those states adopting retail
access has been slow to develop, especially for smaller customers.  This is primarily due to the
narrow retail margins available to competitors due to the manner in which restructuring is being
implemented.  For instance, in Massachusetts and Rhode Island, during the first seven years
following retail access, customers have a choice of buying their power from a competitive retailer
(including utility affiliates) or purchasing it from a utility under a “standard offer.”  The problem
for competitive retailers is that, as part of a complex deal to allow utilities to recover stranded22
costs while encouraging them to divest their generation, the pricing in these standard offers was
set below prevailing wholesale prices during the first several years of transition.  The result is
negative retail margins for utilities and an almost impossible market environment for competitive
retailers.
The market environment is more favorable but still very challenging for competitive
retailers in California.  During an initial four-year transition, all customers’ rates are frozen.  All
customers have the option of continuing to purchase power from their local utility.  The utility is
obligated to purchase all such power from the official spot-market Power Exchange (PX) and
pass it along to customers at cost without any extra profit mark-up.  Customers purchasing power
from competitive retailers pay the frozen price minus these cost-based energy charges.  Thus, to
be attractive on a purely commodity basis, a retailer must offer to sell retail power below the PX
wholesale power cost.  Needless to say, this makes it difficult for competitive retailers to win
market share.  Moreover, the retail price freeze essentially offers all customers a hedge against
spot-market volatility.  Once the four-year transition ends, this volatility in the utilities’ basic
service product will be uncovered and presumably competitive retailers can be considerably more
successful by offering customers retail price hedging services.  Despite these transition conditions
and the much-publicized temporary withdrawal of Enron from the small consumer market in
California, the California market is nonetheless very active.  Companies marketing to residential
and small commercial customers in California must register with the State.  There are 32
registered retailers.  Ten of these retailers are affiliates of traditional utilities including regional
utilities such as Arizona Public Service and Salt River Project as well as large national players
such as Duke, Southern, New England Electric, and Green Mountain Power.  After the first 11
months of market operation, 13.5% of all California IOU loads were being served by competitive
retailers.
To date the market in Pennsylvania is the most amenable to competitive retailers.  Unlike
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and California, when a customer in Pennsylvania purchases power
from a competitive retailer, the customer receives a reduction in its utility bill that exceeds the
wholesale price of electricity by a considerable margin.  This is essentially achieved by making a
portion of the utilities’ stranded cost avoidable by customers switching to competitive retailers.
This creates the possibility of a profit margin for competitive retailers.  But this pricing mechanism
cannot be sustained in the long run, and it is not clear at this time what sustainable mechanism will
be introduced to succeed it.
Successful retail business strategies generally involve one or  more of the following:  (1)
branding, (2) financial hedges, (3) related energy services, (4) “green” power marketing, and (5)
metering and billing services.  Efforts at branding are immediately apparent in Table 2.  Utilities
with distinctive regional names such as Public Service of Indiana, Kentucky Utilities, Louisville
Gas and Electric, San Diego Gas and Electric, Middle South Utilities, and Houston Power and
Light became PSI, KU Energy, LG&E Energy, Enova, Entergy, and Reliant.  Mergers have
created the opportunity to introduce still more new names such as Western Resources, Cinergy,
FirstEnergy, Ameren, Conectiv, New Century Energies, Alliant, and Sempra.23
But jettisoning a well-regarded regional name in pursuit of a national brand can be a
double-edged sword.  Incumbent energy providers have proven to have stronger brand equity
than many critics believed.  Most residential customers will remain with their current provider
assuming the name stays approximately the same and prices remain roughly stead.  This fact has
caused some attempts at obscure national branding to be retracted in favor of names more
recognizable at home while toning down their traditional regionalism.  Thus, Pacific Gas and
Electric initially created Vantus as its retailer but not too long later renamed it PG&E Energy
Services.  Similarly, Public Service Electric and Gas launched Energis before renaming it PSE&G
Energy Technologies.  Southern California Edison became the obscure SCECorp before renaming
itself Edison International – a name with national and international meaning as well as specific
local recognition.  A few other utilities such as Southern and Green Mountain Power are fortunate
to have names that just seem to play well nationally while also retaining long-established local
brand loyalties.
Companies have spent large amounts of money to establish brand names.  For instance,
Enron spent $75 million in 1998 to establish its brand nationally.  In one of the most well
publicized failures, UtiliCorp United spent $20 million launching its EnergyOne in 1995.
EnergyOne was to combine the services of UtiliCorp and PECO Energy with AT&T and electric
security giant ADT Security Services.
8  In 1998, UtiliCorp shut down this multi-utility franchise
branding program with no other utilities having signed up to use the EnergyOne brand.  Most
potential franchisees had been working diligently to strengthen their own brand identity and
viewed the prospective use of EnergyOne as a dilution of their identity.
Retailing to large customers generally involves some mixture of providing commodity
hedges along with diverse energy services.  Hedging by itself is best viewed as essentially a power
marketing activity.  Risks are high and margins are slim.  But provision of energy services is a far
different business.  Energy service companies (ESCOs) provide a wide range of services including
energy-efficient design services, computerized energy use modeling, equipment acquisition and
installation, performance contracting, shared-savings programs, energy monitoring, facilities
management, etc.  ESCOs frequently specialize in developing, installing, and financing
comprehensive, performance-based projects, typically 5-10 years in duration, aimed at improving
the energy efficiency or load duration of customer facilities.  Projects tend to be performance-
based with the ESCO’s compensation tied to the amount of energy actually saved.  About 30-40
major ESCOs are currently active in the U.S.  A few large super-ESCOs (such as Duke Solutions,
Edison Source, Enron Energy Services, PG&E Energy Services, and Xenergy) account for most
of the revenues.
A final important retailing niche is the provision of “green power.”  A significant minority
of customers appears willing to pay a premium for renewable power.  A few marketers are
successfully pursuing this market.  In California, this market is supplemented by a 1.5¢ per kwh
credit to green retailers.  Table 5 shows the green power retailers in California and
                                           
8  Alan Brew and Lew Phelps, “Has Branding Failed the Utility Industry?”, Electricity Journal, November 1998,
pp. 23-29.24
Pennsylvania who have been certified by the independent Green-e program sponsored by the
Center for Resource Solutions located in San Francisco.  Among these, it is worth noting that
APX (Automated Power Exchange) conducts a spot market in green power commerce in
California.
Table 5
Green Power Retailers and Products
California
Commonwealth Energy - GreenSmart
New West Energy* - Green Value
Edison Source* - Earth Source
Green Mountain* -
-
-
Wind for the Future
EarthCare
Renewables Electricity
Keystone Energy - Earth Choice
PG&E Energy Services* - Clean Choice
APX - Green Power Market
PacifiCorp* - Green Power
Foresight Energy - Ecopower
Enron - Earthsmart
Pennsylvania
Conectiv* - Nature’s Power
Green Mountain* -
-
Nature’s Choice
Enviro Blend
* Utility Affiliates
Sources:  Center for Resource Solutions website.
Another important retail strategic dimension involves metering and billing services.  In
most states adopting retail access, competitive retailers have a choice of billing customers directly
or having the utility bill customers on their behalf.  In a few states, such as California, the
competitive retailer can also elect to collect the bill on behalf of the local utility distribution
company, thereby depriving the local utility of any billing contact with the customer.  Many states,
at least for the time being, have chosen to leave metering as an exclusive function of the local
utility.  A few states allow competitive retailers to own, maintain, and read meters.  Competition
in metering and billing is a potentially significant market that is only beginning to take shape.  The
future of this market will depend a great deal on precisely what regulations govern it, especially
the pricing of these services on customer bills and the ability of customers to avoid these charges
by purchasing their metering and billing services from another provider.25
3.6 Diversification Into Telecommunications
During the 1980s, several U.S. utilities ventured far from their traditional expertise and
attempted diversifications into such wide-ranging businesses as real estate, financial services, and
even retail sporting goods and drug stores.  For the most part, these diversifications proved to be
miserable failures and engendered longlasting negative reactions from the U.S. financial
community.  Consequently, utility diversifications in the 1990s have generally involved closely
related businesses with reasonably clear prospects for business complementarity.  Among the most
frequently pursued diversifications are those into various telecommunications businesses.  Indeed,
deregulation in both the telecommunications and electric power industries is causing numerous
strategies to be launched that seem likely to produce greater convergence in these two mega-
industries.  The strategy is at least superficially plausible, but the new business is complex and the
risks associated with certain business strategies may be quite high.  Though some will probably
succeed, there may also be many failures.
For years, U.S. electric utilities have had ample legal authority to build telecommunication
facilities to operate their electric utilities and most utilities already have extensive
telecommunication facilities used to manage their electric systems.  Even before the advent of
retail access, electric utilities began recognizing that they could use broadband, switched
telecommunications to retail customers to enable substantial efficiency gains in their utility
systems.  With the spread of retail access, far more voluminous flows of real-time information will
be valuable to inform customers or their retailing agents as well as to drive end-use, load
management software and smart meters.  Without the widespread development of such two-way
communication on the grid, much of the potential benefits of retail access will fail to be realized.
Indeed, without such two-way communication, perceived real-time demands may be so price-
inelastic that the resulting price volatility in energy spot markets may create a political backlash
sufficient to slow down or arrest the spread of current retail access initiatives.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 opens the door for electric utilities by lifting
restrictions on the use of their existing telecom networks and enabling them to compete broadly in
telecommunications businesses.  As a result, utilities have begun leasing to telecom service
providers the excess capacity (i.e., “dark fiber”) on their networks.  Some electric utilities have
even taken this a step further and have begun operating as telecom service providers themselves
through partnerships, acquisitions, or unregulated subsidiaries.  As summarized in Table 6,
utilities are generally offering wholesale services, wireline services including voice and data, and
they are also beginning to penetrate wireless services.26
Table 6
Selected Ventures by Electric Companies Into Telecommunications
Services
Companies Wholesale Wireline Wireless
American Electric Power (AEP) x
Boston Edison x
Carolina Power and Light x
Central and Southwest x x
Conectiv x x
Duke x
Edison International x
Enron x
Entergy x
KN Energy x
LG&E Energy x
Montana Power x
PacifiCorp x x
SCANA x x
Southern Company x
Texas Utilities x x
Virginia Power (VEPCO) x x
Source:  McGraw-Hill, Electric Utility Week, 1996-1999.
The expansion of electric utilities into telecom is driven by their efforts to compete in
changing electric power markets, consumer demand for bundled services, and simple
attractiveness of growth opportunities in telecom.  While annual growth in electric industry
revenues is forecast to be around 2 percent, annual growth in telecom revenues are expected to be
around 7 percent.  In entering the telecom market, utilities are competing directly with incumbent
telecom companies and numerous aspiring new entrants.  This competition includes the regional
Bell Operating Companies, interchange carriers, Internet service providers, cable television
providers, competitive access providers, and competitive local exchange carriers.  In this
competition, electric utilities can expect to be disadvantaged by their general lack of expertise in
telecom technologies and competitive retail marketing.  However, they also enter the field with
certain important advantages including an extensive customer base, usually a reputation for
reliable high-quality service, ownership of valuable rights-of-way and telecom infrastructure,
widespread name recognition and a functioning billing engine capable of rendering complex bills.
Electric utilities can generally take one of three courses in venturing further into the
telecom industry:  (1) form strategic partnerships with existing telecom companies, (2) acquire
telecom companies, or (3) branch out on their own.  The partnering strategy allows a utility to
gain many of the strength that it lacks.  For instance, Pacific Gas and Electric has partnered with
Microsoft and cable giant TCI; TECO Energy with IBM; PSE&G with AT&T; UtiliCorp with
Novell; KN Energy with Metricom; AEP with Sprint; Boston Edison with RCN; CP&L and Duke
with Bell South; and PEPCO with RCN and Metricom.
There are also examples of purchases of telecom companies by electric utilities.  AEP has
recently purchased personal communication service (PCS) companies in Virginia and West27
Virginia to provide improved energy information products and services to its electric customer.
SCANA is acquiring major equity interests in companies such as InterCel providing PCS in the
wireless communications market.  Texas Utilities has acquired Lufkin-Conroe to provide a full
range of local and long-distance telecom services.  The Williams Company has formed a joint
venture (WilTel) with Northern Telecom which offers a variety of data, multimedia, voice and
video interconnect products.  WilTel has, in turn, acquired Bell South’s customer premise
equipment sales and service operations in 29 states as well as two network system integrators,
Comlink and SoftIron.
Several utilities are undertaking major internal expansions either individually or jointly
with other energy utilities.  Conectiv has transferred its fiber optic assets to a subsidiary and plans
to provide local telephone and long distance services in Delaware, Maryland, southeastern
Pennsylvania and southern New Jersey.  Through DukeNet, Duke Power will provide PCS in the
Charlotte area in partnership with BellSouth, CP&L, and 31 Carolina-based independent
telephone companies.  DukeNet is currently leasing its excess fiber to carriers and is building a
fiber-coax hybrid network to eventually deliver Internet access, home security and automation
services to homes.  Enron owns a 55-mile fiber optic network surrounding the Portland area and
plans to provide wholesale services and high-speed video, data, and multimedia services.  In
conjunction with Williams and Montana Power, Enron is building a 1,620 mile fiber-optic
network from Portland to Los Angeles.  Montana Power, through Touch America, provides
interconnection services in all of Montana’s major cities as well as long distance services in the
northwestern U.S.  PacifiCorp and KN Energy have teamed up to offer an integrated package of
energy long distance telephone, cellular paging, Internet, and satellite television services under the
Simple Choice brand.  SCANA offers telecom services over its 900-mile fiber-optic network (Gulf
States FiberNet) running through Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas.  Southern
Company developed an extensive wireless network, called Southern LINC to respond to its
customer’s emergency needs.  Southern is now offering a variety of wireless telecom services.
Finally, Williams, through Vyvx offers broadcast-quality television and multimedia transmission
services nationwide using its 17,000-mile fiber-optic and satellite systems.
3.7 Independent Transmission Companies
High-voltage transmission continues to be regulated by FERC (except in Texas).  Retail
access tends to expand FERC’s authority to lower voltage wires.  The precise delineation of this
authority still needs to be clarified.  At least for now, high-voltage transmission continues to be
owned by the same incumbent utilities owning the local distribution facilities.  This produces a
patchwork of transmission ownership broadly corresponding to current utilities’ local retail
franchise areas.  As the industry undergoes restructuring from vertical columns to horizontal
layers, the question naturally arises as to whether these separate local transmission companies will
be separated eventually from their traditional distribution affiliates and rebundled over broad
geographic areas to form so-called “transcos” through mergers, acquisitions, or joint ventures.28
Although it is appealing to draw direct analogies to interstate gas pipelines, certain
difference must be acknowledged.  Gas pipelines generally provide unidirectional flow from
distant gas fields to city gates.  By contrast, electric transmission lines integrate regional
generation resources and customers in a fabric of multiple, redundant paths with constantly
varying line flows.  But the network interdependencies caused by parallel electric flows simply
provides all the more reason for regional consolidation of electric grid control.  This integration
can be achieved either through ISOs or regional transcos, but there is a debate raging over which
institutional form will or should ultimately prevail.
Utilities in states undergoing retail restructuring originally embraced ISOs as a means for
shedding their vertical market power so that they could receive market-based pricing approval
while also retaining a large portion of their generation.  Ultimately, to placate regulators and
facilitate recovery of their stranded costs, many of these utilities saw more wisdom in divesting
larger amounts of their generation than originally contemplated.  The FERC embraced ISOs as a
superior way to eliminate vertical market power compared to the policing provisions of Orders
888 and 889.  Therefore, as a condition for approving mergers, FERC began requiring
participation in regional RTOs.
Integrating regional control over the grid through a not-for-profit ISO has certain
advantages.  It can be accomplished rather quickly over wide areas and accommodates
participation by both IOUs and public power entities.  Its degree of independence is more credible
to a wide variety of stakeholders, and FERC seems more comfortable affording ISOs “light-
handed” regulation and delegating to them an active market oversight role.  Yet there are also
potentially serious drawbacks to ISOs.  They are no more independent than the composition of
their governing boards, and the separation of transmission ownership from control raises serious
concerns about incentives for efficient operations and investments.
The term “transco” is usually used to refer to an independent transmission company that
also performs the customary functions of an ISO.  In this sense, ISOs and transcos are mutually
exclusive choices.  But an independent broad regional transmission company could also exist
underneath the control of an ISO.  The term “gridco” is sometimes used to distinguish this
situation.  Sometimes it is suggested that an ISO might serve as an interim institution until a
gridco of sufficient size is formed.  Eventually, the gridco could assume the ISO’s responsibilities
and become a transco.  But there are reasons to be skeptical of the political feasibility of such a
path.
Proponents of integrating regional grid control under a transco emphasize the alignment of
ownership and control, and the greater incentives for efficiency.  Critics emphasize the difficulties
of policing transco independence, structuring efficient operating and investment incentives,
quickly achieving broad geographic scope, and attracting the participation of public power
entities.
There are various entities which own extensive transmission systems in the U.S.  These
include large holding companies such as AEP, Southern and Entergy, as well as large federal
entities such as Bonneville Power Administration, TVA, and WAPA.  The UK’s National Grid
Group recently acquired NEES and EUA, both of which have divested most of their generation
and retain largely wires assets only.  In essence, the National Grid Company owns a gridco under
the New England ISO.  Elsewhere, certain IOUs are attempting to press the transco issue with29
FERC.  For instance, in April 1999, Entergy filed the general structure of a transco proposal with
FERC and asked for an expedited declaratory order that its proposal met FERC’s requirements
for an RTO so that Entergy could attract additional regional participants in its transco as soon as
possible.  In June 1999, the Alliance transco applied for approval by FERC.  Its members include
AEP, CMS, Detroit Edison, FirstEnergy, and VEPCO.  The Alliance transco would be larger than
any of the previously approved ISOs.  The Alliance transco is currently the primary test case for
FERC approval of a transco.
Seemingly stripped of its strategic value to assist commercial affiliates, the business value
of owning transmission becomes an open question.  Price regulation by FERC will be key.  To the
extent that FERC imposes low rates of equity return and low depreciation rates on transmission
investments, many will view transmission as a bad business.  But sooner or later, FERC will have
to adopt reasonable policies to encourage grid investments.  Expert transmission companies with
world-class skills in grid expansion, operation and investment will eventually find it attractive to
consolidate ownership of the U.S. grid.  To be successful, they will have to negotiate favorable
regulation (presumably, performance-based), control costs, and correctly anticipate and
accommodate the economics of distributed generation.
3.8 Foreign Investment in the U.S.
With a few notable exceptions, except for British companies, international firms have not
been major investors in the U.S. market.  National Power (UK) through its affiliate American
National Power is by far the largest foreign player in the U.S. generation market with over 1,600
MW operating and over 5,000 MW planned or under construction.  Tractabel (Belgium) has over
1,200 MW in operation and over 1,100 MW planned or in development.  Several other foreign
firms also have small positions in the U.S. generation market.  Sithe Energies, a firm incorporated
in the U.S. and generally regarded as a domestic firm even though it is controlled by Japanese and
French investors, has one of the largest portfolios of independent generation projects in the U.S.
totaling about 3,500 MW in operation with 4,300 MW more planned or under construction in the
northeast.
UK companies are also pursuing acquisitions of traditional U.S. electric utilities.  For
instance, National Grid is purchasing New England Electric System and Scottish Power is
acquiring PacifiCorp.  Presumably these companies plan to apply the lessons they have learned in
the UK to the evolving U.S. markets.
3.9 U.S. Investment Abroad
In recent years, U.S. companies have begun making extensive investments in electricity
production and distribution facilities in foreign countries.  Although some of this investment has
come from traditional overseas investors like U.S. oil companies, most has come from traditional
IOUs and unaffiliated U.S. generation developers.  Several related forces are behind this sudden
explosion of U.S. foreign investment.  First, when EPAct amended PUHCA, it defined the legal
concept of a “Foreign Utility Company” and exempted such enterprises from the general PUHCA
requirement that facilities must be physically interconnected.  Thereafter, U.S. companies
investing overseas in electric facilities were freed from the administrative burden and uncertainty
of having to seek a PUHCA exemption from the Security and Exchange Commission.  The
second important force was the growing privatization and liberalization of electricity markets30
throughout the world.  Without these changes, there would have been far fewer opportunities for
U.S. foreign investment.  The U.K., Norway, Argentina, Chile, New Zealand, the European
Union, and Victoria, Australia have all adopted the principles of competition and open access.  A
third important force has been the general slowdown of the expansion of the U.S. electricity
sector in the past 20 years compared to the growth prospects for electricity demand abroad.
While U.S. demand growth has slowed below 2%, electricity demand in some foreign countries is
forecast to grow at an annual rate of 7% in the next decade.  At home, U.S. companies experience
fierce competition with other U.S. firms to build the new generation necessary to satisfy the
limited growth in the domestic market.  While competition abroad is also active, bidding successes
and larger margins may be easier to achieve.
The emerging international power business is dominated by companies from the U.S. and
U.K.  Large markets developed most quickly in Asia and Latin America, with markets in Eastern
Europe and the Middle East developing later.  The major U.S. companies that appear most
committed to an international power business include CMS, Central and South West, Duke,
Edison, Entergy, GPU, PSE&G, Reliant, NRG, Southern, Texas Utilities, AES, and Enron.  U.S.
companies appear to be following a variety of business strategies overseas.  Some seem to be
specializing in the acquisition and management of transmission and distribution infrastructure.
Others seem to be specializing largely in the development of generation facilities.  Still others
seem to be interested in pursuing a mixed portfolio of distribution and generation, either
separately or as integrated systems.
Risk management is one of the most important success factors in the international power
business.  There are plenty of risks to be managed including ordinary investment and fuel risks,
but also political, sovereignty, contractual, and foreign exchange risks.  Risk management favors
enterprises of large size.  It also favors joint projects including other international developers, fuel
suppliers, and banks as well as local strategic partners.  Another reason size and partnering are
important is access to capital.  Larger firms are generally able to use their superior access to
capital markets to move more quickly and avoid project financing delays that may hamper smaller
firms.  To develop a generation portfolio in today’s market requires an initial capital contribution
of at least $500 million.  It takes about $5 to $10 million to assemble a viable project proposal.
This means that with a success rate of one-in-ten, it would take an outlay of about $500 million to
develop a portfolio of ten successful projects.  A few independents such as AES and CalEnergy
have been able to build sufficient scale from meager beginnings.  Other developers such as Edison
Mission Energy have built scale slowly over the same timeframe, although with the assistance of a
sizable parent.  Finally, some newcomers have been able to acquire scale instantaneously through
acquisition, such as Southern Company’s purchase of established international generation
developer CEPA.
To the extent U.S. companies are creating value through their international investments,
they are either creating new assets through their deal-making skills or enhancing the value of
existing assets.  Owning and operating these facilities for their lifespan may not be their best
strategy.  Indeed, for some host countries, foreign financing of too large a portion of the domestic
energy sector may cause balance of payment problems thereby necessitating greater sharing of
energy project ownership with local investors in the long term.  Also, in order to develop a
project, sponsors often must assume greater equity than they would like to hold in the long term.
Ideally, they would prefer to have smaller equity amounts in a larger number of projects, thereby31
obtaining greater leverage from their capital.  To obtain this balance, they frequently sell off a
portion of their equity at a later stage of the project.
Thus, over the long term, U.S. companies will need to decide the balance they wish to
achieve between entrepreneurial project development and long-term portfolio investment in
operating energy facilities.  These emerging global power companies will be active traders in these
assets, buying and selling assets to take capital gains, raise capital for new project opportunities,
and rebalance portfolios.  They will maintain control over many of their assets, although not
necessarily through majority ownership.  They will use their deal-making skills, access to capital
markets, and knowledge of local markets and politics as their main competitive advantages in
acquiring both new and existing assets.
Several U.S. companies appear to be interested in the acquisition and management of
transmission and distribution infrastructure.  Distribution, in particular, offers opportunities for
substantial profits in some host countries because this is where many of the inefficiencies are to be
found.  Also, by purchasing distribution companies in already open-access markets, U.S.
companies hope to more quickly develop the corporate culture and expertise necessary to succeed
in restructured markets at home.  Over half the U.K. regional electricity companies, by value, are
now owned by U.S. firms as are over three quarters of the distribution and supply companies in
Victoria, Australia.  For instance, in early 1997, giant AEP joined with Public Service Colorado in
paying $2.44 billion to acquire Yorkshire Electricity, a U.K. regional electric company.  In late
1998, AEP announced an agreement with Entergy to purchase CitiPower, an electric distribution
and retail sales company serving part of Melbourne, Australia.  In late 1995, Central and South
West acquired the SEEBOARD regional electric company in the U.K. for $2.52 billion.  Since
1996, CSW has also purchased multiple small distribution companies in Brazil.  CSW is also
developing generation resources in both Brazil and the U.K.  GPU has been especially active in
acquiring overseas transmission and distribution infrastructure.  In 1996, GPU joined with
Cinergy in paying $2.59 billion for Midlands Electricity, a U.K. regional electric company.  In
1998, GPU paid $1.9 billion to acquire PowerNet, the transmission system of the state of
Victoria, Australia.  In 1999, GPU announced the purchase of Transmissions Pipelines Australia,
a gas transmission company that it will rename GasNet.  GPU has also been bidding on New
Zealand distribution companies.  In addition, GPU owns interests in nearly 7,000 MW of
generation at 21 sites in eight countries overseas.  In 1995, Texas Utilities (TXU) won a bid for
$1.6 billion to purchase Eastern Energy, a power distributor carved out of the former State
Electricity Commission of Victoria.  In 1998, TXU expanded its distribution companies to the
U.K. and the Czech Republic when it purchased The Energy Group, which owned Eastern
Electricity, the largest of the U.K. regional electric companies.  Eastern Generation also owns,
operates, or has an interest in eight power stations in the U.K. making TXU a significant
generation player as well.  Reliant has purchased several distribution companies and integrated
utilities in Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, and Argentina.  Finally, UtiliCorp United has followed a
strategy of purchasing systems in English-speaking countries.  In 1987, UtiliCorp acquired West
Kootenay Power in Canada.  Through a series of acquisitions beginning in 1993, UtiliCorp has
assembled UnitedNetworks Limited, the largest wires operator in New Zealand.  In 1995, a three-
company consortium led by UtiliCorp purchased United Energy, serving parts of Melbourne,
Australia, for $1.15 billion.  In early 1999, UtiliCorp and an Australian partner acquired
Multinet/Ikon, the largest gas distribution and retail company in Victoria, Australia.32
On the other side of the strategic spectrum are U.S. companies that have largely avoided
investing in transmission and distribution infrastructure, instead choosing to specialize in
generation development and acquisition.  Among the traditional utilities doing so are Dominion
(VEPCO), Duke, Edison Mission Energy, and NRG (Northern States Power).  All four
companies were early domestic developers of independent power producers.  Entergy has also
joined the move toward international generation development after brief ventures into distribution
companies.  Dominion is a relatively smaller player internationally and owns generation mainly in
Latin America.  Duke likewise had developed projects mainly in Latin America.  Edison Mission
Energy is currently the largest owner of independent power projects worldwide with major
holdings in the U.K., Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, Spain, Thailand, and Italy.  NRG is also
a large player internationally, with major generation plants in Australia, Germany, Latin America,
and the Czech Republic.  In 1996, Entergy purchased CitiPower, a distribution company in
Melbourne.  In 1997, it purchased London Electric, a major U.K. regional electric company.
Subsequently, Entergy sold both CitiPower and London Electric, and now specializes largely in
generation in the U.K., Argentina, Pakistan, Peru, and Chile.
U.S. independents are also major generation developers abroad.  The largest among these
are AES, CalEnergy, Enron, and Dynegy.  As discussed below, AES, CalEnergy, and Enron all
have major investments in distribution companies as well.  Only Dynegy continues to specialize
overseas mainly in generation development.  In 1996, Dynegy divested to AES its plants in
Australia, the Netherlands, U.K., Canada and the Dominican Republic.  In the future, Dynegy
plans to concentrate its overseas efforts on Europe where it has major affiliated natural gas
facilities.  In June 1999, Dynegy and Illinova, a traditional U.S. utility, announced plans to merge
thereby forming a $7.5 billion combined company.
Finally, many U.S. companies are pursuing both generation as well as separate distribution
or integrated utilities overseas.  Among the traditional utilities pursuing this course are CMS,
Reliant, PacifCorp, PSE&G, and Southern.  CMS was a relative latecomer to independent power
development, but it has rapidly acquired both greenfield and privatized plants in Argentina,
Australia, Brazil, India, Jamaica, Morocco, and the Philippines.  In Argentina, Chile and the
Philippines, CMS has developed and acquired clusters of assets including generation, distribution,
transmission, and natural gas pipelines.  Reliant owns major distribution facilities in Brazil and El
Salvador as well as major generation plants in Colombia, Brazil and Argentina.  In 1995,
PacifiCorp acquired Powercor, an Australian power distributor, for $1.6 billion.  In 1996,
PacifiCorp was a partner in a consortium purchasing a major Australian powerplant.  In 1998,
PacifiCorp opened an office in Istanbul and is focusing on generation projects in Turkey, the
Mideast and Eastern Europe.  PSE&G is another relative latecomer to international development.
PSE&G has distribution companies in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, as well as major generation
plants in Argentina, China, India and Venezuela.33
Southern Company is also a latecomer, but a giant.  In the U.S., Southern is a huge
holding company with a system of 31,000 MW spread across five major operating companies in
the southeast.  In 1997, Southern purchased Consolidated Electric Power Asia (CEPA) the
largest independent power producer in Asia, for $3.4 billion.  In 1995, Southern made a
successful hostile takeover of South Western Electric, a U.K. regional electric company.
Southern now owns South Western Electric in partnership with PP&L.  Southern has also
purchased a significant share of CEMIG, a large integrated Brazilian utility, with over 5,000 MW
of generation and has increased generation and gas pipeline investments in Chile.  Southern also
purchased a 26% share in BEWAG, a large integrated utility serving Berlin, Germany and having
over 3,000 MW of generation.  Southern has also purchased significant generation and
distribution in Argentina, Chile, Trinidad, and the Bahamas.
Even though U.S. independents generally got their starts solely as developers of
generation within the U.S., the major independents have all pursued distribution in addition to
generation investments abroad.  These large independents include AES, CalEnergy, and Enron.
AES is the largest of the independents and a giant by any standard.  AES has active generation
projects in about 20 foreign countries.  AES is also a partner in CEMIG, the large integrated
Brazilian utility with over 5,000 MW of generation.  It also participates in seven other distribution
companies, all in Latin America.  CalEnergy focuses on generation development in Europe,
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Latin America.  However, in 1996, it also succeeded in a hostile
takeover of Northern Electric, a U.K. regional electric company.  Enron is another huge
independent operating internationally.  In its overseas activities, Enron is mainly a developer of
generation with projects in about 20 foreign countries.  In 1998, Enron purchased a major
distribution company in Sao Paulo Brazil, for $1.272 billion.  Enron also owns interest in eight
state gas distributors in Brazil.
4.0 Discussion
This chapter has addressed the rapidly evolving business strategies of U.S. electric
companies in response to both the opening of wholesale and retail competition at home as well as
the privatization of electric enterprises and liberalization of electricity markets abroad.  Much of
what is happening can only be adequately understood against the background of the dual federal-
state regulatory framework in the U.S..  Although the federal government has done much to
facilitate and encourage competition in wholesale markets, these markets are still technically
regulated and likely to remain so for sometime further.  Retail competition has been introduced in
nearly half the states and for well over half the population.  Although a federal Congressional
mandate of retail competition seems possible, most observers do not believe it is imminent.
Nonetheless, retail competition can be expected to spread steadily to the remaining states over the
next decade.
Although retail competition has been adopted in 23 states, these restructurings are
generally being phased-in over several years and markets are currently open in only a handful of
states.  While the changes in corporate structures and strategies have already been dramatic,
further huge changes can be expected.  Domestically, U.S. business strategies are heavily
influenced by the emerging regulations governing restructuring.  In the near term, corporate
strategies have been understandably obsessed with the recovery of stranded generation costs.
This has generally led to one of the most visible signs of corporate restructuring – the massive34
divestiture of roughly 100,000 MW of generation in order to determine the market value of assets
for stranded cost recovery purposes.  For the most part, this generation has simply been
purchased by other large U.S. utilities and placed in their “unregulated” subsidiaries.
Another highly visible hallmark of restructuring has been the large number of mergers and
major acquisitions.  In many cases, these mergers have been motivated by the general belief that,
up to a point, bigger will be better in the new competitive world.  Many mergers have been
“convergence mergers” between electric and gas companies in accordance with the belief that
unifying these two energy sources enables a company to offer customers preferred integrated
energy services and also allows the company to better manage its electric generation fuel risks.
Following passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, many electric utilities have also
become aggressive in diversifying into various telecommunication businesses.
Ironically, the one competitive area that remains most unclear is retailing.  Many
companies are attempting to achieve national branding successes, but so far the evidence of
success is mixed.  In most regions, retail competition has been slow to develop and incumbent
utilities still retain the bulk of smaller customers.  In some states, retail customers are being
subsidized to switch to new competitive retailers.  But this policy cannot be sustained in the long
run and it is not clear what public policy will supersede it.
It is also not at all clear what the future of the U.S. transmission grid will be.  For the most
part, the grid has been constructed historically through interconnections among autonomous local
utilities.  It seems almost certain that this structure is not a stable equilibrium in the new
restructured environment and will evolve in the direction of consolidated ownership.  However, it
is not clear what institution will pursue consolidation.  Presumably, consolidators will be
independent standalone for-profit transmission companies.  But development of such institutions
will likely require greater financial encouragement from FERC.
One of the most dramatic trends in recent years has been the interest by U.S. utilities in
investment abroad.  Some U.S. players have been developing this business steadily over the last
decade or longer (e.g., Edison Mission Energy, AES).  Others have burst on the scene only
recently with huge acquisitions of generation (e.g., Southern’s purchase of CEPA) or distribution
systems (e.g., acquisition of the UK and Australian regional electric companies).  It remains to be
seen how many of these ventures are truly value-creating and based on solid business expertise
and how many are simply the latest example of ill-fated utility diversifications.
In conclusion, although many trends are taking shape, it is too early in the game to
accurately predict the outcomes.  But the stakes are high and the game should be fascinating for
participants and spectators alike.